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The Role of Causal Processes in the
Neutral and Nearly Neutral Theories
Michael R. Dietrich and Roberta L. Millstein†
The neutral and nearly neutral theories of molecular evolution are sometimes char-
acterized as theories about drift alone, where drift is described solely as an outcome,
rather than a process. We argue, however, that both selection and drift, as causal
processes, are integral parts of both theories. However, the nearly neutral theory ex-
plicitly recognizes alleles and/or molecular substitutions that, while engaging in weakly
selected causal processes, exhibit outcomes thought to be characteristic of random
drift. A narrow focus on outcomes obscures the significant role of weakly selected
causal processes in the nearly neutral theory.
1. Introduction. Gabriel Dover once complained that being nearly neutral
is like being “just a little bit pregnant” (Dover 1997, 91). Dover’s point
is that “nearly neutral” really means “a little bit selective,” and once you’ve
allowed for a little bit of selection, what’s to stop more and more selection
from being incorporated into your model?1 And then, does anything re-
main of neutrality? Dover’s comment thus calls into question the role of
both selection and drift in the nearly neutral theory.
The neutral theory was articulated and defended by Motoo Kimura as
a way to explain molecular variation and evolution. From its introduction
in 1968, the neutral theory posited that evolution at the molecular level
did not proceed by selection alone. The nearly neutral theory of molecular
evolution was introduced in 1973 by Tomoko Ohta as a variant of the
neutral theory. Ohta worked closely with Motoo Kimura and like Kimura
was especially interested in explaining molecular evolution with a com-
bination of drift and selection.
†To contact the authors, please write to: Department of Biological Sciences, Dartmouth
College, Hanover, NH 03755; e-mail: Michael.Dietrich@Dartmouth.edu; Roberta L.
Millstein, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, One Shields
Avenue, Davis, CA 95616; e-mail: RLMillstein@UCDavis.edu.
1. Dover’s position is actually a bit more nuanced than this, since Dover would have
us consider other “deterministic” (nonstochastic) processes besides selection.
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In this article we will use Millstein’s (2002, 2005) distinction between
process and outcome to distinguish the roles of drift and selection in both
the neutral and nearly neutral theories. We will defend the claim that, as
a conceptual matter, the neutral and nearly neutral theories are not only
about drift—both drift and selection understood as processes figure im-
portantly in both theories. As theories of the combined action of drift
and selection, advocates of the neutral theory and the nearly neutral
theory are particularly attuned to the problem of distinguishing drift from
selection. We interpret their success in empirically differentiating drift and
selection in terms of ongoing efforts to find unique ways to detect causal
processes by articulating determinative associations between outcomes
and processes.
2. Process and Outcome in Molecular Evolution. By “causal process” we
mean a series of causally connected physical states occurring over time,
whereas by “outcome” we mean the effect, or ending state at a particular
point in time, of that process (or any series of such ending states).2 In
order to understand why the distinction between process and outcome is
important for distinguishing drift from selection, consider Kimura’s def-
inition of drift: “By random genetic drift I mean random fluctuation of
gene frequencies in a population caused by random sampling of gametes
in reproduction. In any sexually reproducing species, the total number of
individuals is not only finite, but also can be regarded as a random sample
chosen from a much larger collection of male and female gametes (or
‘gene pool’) produced by the parental generation. The amount of fluc-
tuation in gene frequencies (that is, proportion of various alleles) is ex-
pected to be larger, the smaller the population” (Kimura 1983, 37). Notice
that Kimura’s definition of drift incorporates both “process” and “out-
come”; the “process” is the random sampling of gametes, and the “out-
come” is the random fluctuation of gene frequencies. This definition cre-
ates an ambiguity, an ambiguity that is not unique to Kimura: are all
instances of random sampling instances of drift? Are all random fluctu-
ations in gene frequencies instances of drift? The latter was suggested by
Wright (1955), but it is problematic to define drift in this way. The same
type of outcome, where gene frequencies appear to fluctuate randomly
from one generation to the next, can be produced by selection in a chang-
ing environment. Selection in a changing environment is a much different
phenomenon than the random sampling of gametes. Thus, however we
are to define drift and selection, it cannot be in terms of their outcomes,
2. This is, of course, a very common distinction, occurring in numerous nonevolu-
tionary contexts, where it is usually couched in terms of “process” and “product.”
Here we avoid the term “product” because of its teleological connotations.
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or we risk being unable to distinguish two very different biological phe-
nomena. Our concepts should be rich enough to capture important bio-
logical differences.
A better way of defining drift and selection is in terms of causal pro-
cesses. As we just noted, Kimura saw the underlying process of drift as
random gamete sampling; other biologists have included other types of
random sampling such as that occurring when a small subset of founders
establish a new population. “Random” sampling is “indiscriminate sam-
pling” (Beatty 1984); in other words, a process in which heritable physical
differences between organisms (at any stage, including the gametic) are
causally irrelevant to differences in reproductive success (Millstein 2002).
Then, selection can be defined in a parallel way, as “discriminate sampling”
(Beatty 1984); that is, it can be defined as a process in which physical
differences are causally relevant to differences in reproductive success
(Millstein 2002). In this way, the concepts distinguish between two bio-
logically important phenomena. We will show that distinguishing the pro-
cesses of natural selection and random drift and the outcomes of natural
selection and random drift is crucial for understanding the neutral and
nearly neutral theories conceptually and empirically.
3. The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution. When Kimura and others
began to champion the neutral theory in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
they argued that a significant portion of the observed variations at the
molecular level (in proteins and nucleic acids) were neutral or effectively
neutral and so subject to drift (King and Jukes 1969). Advocating a strong
role for neutrality and drift was especially controversial given the strong
panselectionist attitude held by most organismal evolutionary biologists
at the time (Kimura 1983; Dietrich 1994, 1998; Mitchell and Dietrich
2006). The neutral theory is much more than just a theory of genetic drift,
however; selection also plays an important role in the neutral theory.
An important key to understanding the claims made for the neutral
and nearly neutral theory lies in the distinction between mutation and
substitutions, or, as John Gillespie (1991) calls them, origination processes
and fixation (substitution) processes. Origination processes account for
the origin of mutations. Substitution processes account for what happens
to mutants once they are created. Drift and selection are both substitution
processes. Kimura, Ohta, and other neutralists freely accepted that many
mutations are created that are never detected because most mutants are
probably selected against and occasionally a rare advantageous mutation
is selected for. These mutants leave the population quickly or go to fixation
quickly and so are not detected as differences. Kimura and Ohta would
like to explain the observed frequencies of detected variation or poly-
morphisms. Where leading selectionists argued that detected polymor-
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phisms were actively maintained in a population by selection (balancing
selection for heterozygote superior combinations, for instance; Lewontin
1974), neutralists explained polymorphism in a population as neutral or
nearly neutral mutants that were on their way to fixation or loss. These
mutants were transient polymorphisms and were detectable simply because
they were not quickly eliminated or fixed (Kimura and Ohta 1971). The
core of the neutralist-selectionist debate then is not an all-or-nothing dispute
pitting selection against drift but a debate over the relative importance of
drift and selection for explaining these detected polymorphisms in a popula-
tion.
From the start, Kimura and Ohta recognized that not all neutral mu-
tants were the same. Some mutants were considered to be strictly neutral,
whereas others were considered to be nearly (or effectively) neutral. How-
ever, once again, there is ambiguity in the definitions. For example, Ki-
mura once described the difference between neutral and nearly neutral
mutations as follows: neutral mutations are the result of nucleotide sub-
stitutions that yield the same amino acid (“synonymous” mutations),3
whereas nearly neutral mutations are those amino acid substitutions where
there is “very little effect on the biological activity of the protein” (Kimura
1968b, 247). These definitions are what we might call functional defini-
tions; they focus on the way the protein resulting from the mutation
functions in the organism.4 That is, neutral mutations are considered to
be mutations where the same function obtains, whereas nearly neutral
mutations are mutations where “nearly” the same function obtains.
Elsewhere, however, Kimura describes the difference between neutral
and nearly neutral mutations differently. These definitions seem to focus
instead on the expected outcomes of the differing functional types, usually
statistical measures of population features such as heterozygosity. Here,
neutral mutations are those where the selective coefficient is zero, whereas
nearly neutral mutations are those where the selection coefficient is very
3. Subsequent studies of codon bias call into question the claim that these substitutions
are actually neutral (see note 7 for further discussion).
4. Note that these definitions do not consider environmental context, perhaps because
of the assumption that there would be few or no phenotypic differences between mu-
tants. However, Ohta later acknowledged the complications that consideration of en-
vironmental context would bring, especially under a changing environment. Any new
mutants can be advantageous under restricted conditions but are generally disadvan-
tageous in adapted systems. So, if the environment is diverse, it is almost impossible
for a mutant to be advantageous under all conditions. In contrast, if the environment
is uniform, a mutant will have a better chance of being advantageous. The probability
of becoming advantageous for a mutant is larger in small populations than in larger
ones. In these circumstances it is very difficult to distinguish between advantageous,
neutral, and slightly deleterious mutant classes (Ohta 2000, 1623).
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much less than the inverse of the population size (Kimura 1968a). That
is, with nearly neutral mutations, the effects of drift are expected to swamp
the effects of weak selection given the population size, that is, they are
“effectively” neutral. In contrast, note that the functional definitions are
independent of population size. The functional definitions represent a
causal approach, rather than an outcome-oriented definition.
We argue that the functional definition of nearly neutral, with its focus on
the causal, is preferable to the expected outcome definition. An outcome-
oriented approach is essentially claiming that effectively neutral mutations
are expected to undergo drift, after which we determine if in fact they have
undergone drift.5 Although this is not, strictly speaking, circular reasoning,
it certainly borders on the circular. The causal approach, however, claims
that mutations that result in differing functions are expected to undergo
weak selection as well as drift. This is less circular; as discussed below,
the functional claim can be tested independently of the outcomes for the
population.6
Furthermore, finding an outcome that accurately picks out the drift
process and allows it to be distinguished from mixed drift and selection
processes and selection processes is not that simple. One of the advantages
claimed for the neutral theory when it was initially advocated was that
it made quantitative predictions that could be easily tested (Crow 1969;
Kimura and Ohta 1971). So if you thought that neutral mutants were
nonsense, you’d be able to demonstrate it quickly and move on to your
selectionist program. Unfortunately, drift and selection were not easily
distinguished despite the neutral theory’s predictions. Important early
tests of neutrality and selection did not have enough statistical power
(Ewens 1972). Other tests depended on problematic assumptions. The
result was that there was not a clear outcome that could unequivocally
be said to only result from a process of genetic drift. Put another way,
the causal processes associated with selection were acknowledged to be
important, but their extent could not be established because the kinds of
outcomes presented in the existing molecular data did not allow processes
of drift and selection to be clearly distinguished.
All of the early empirical tests of the neutral theory depended on data
regarding proteins (either protein sequences, immunological affinities, or
5. Or, it could simply be the case that neutral mutations are identified purely after the
fact, in terms of what types of outcomes are produced. Again, however, this outcome-
oriented approach runs the risk of glossing over dissimilar biological phenomena that
happen to produce the same outcome.
6. Masatoshi Nei offers additional criticisms of what we have called the expected
outcomes definition of neutrality and argues for what we have called the functional
definition (2005).
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electrophoretic analysis). In the mid-1980s, Martin Kreitman introduced
DNA sequence analysis into evolutionary genetics. With the rising avail-
ability of DNA sequence data thanks to PCR technology, biologists de-
vised much more definitive statistical tests of neutrality and selection.
DNA-based tests of neutrality took advantage of phenomena such as the
redundancy of the genetic code. Redundancy at the third position of many
codons means that nucleotide substitutions will not result in amino acid
substitutions at the protein level. These synonymous mutants then should
not be subject to selection based on their effect or lack thereof at the
protein level.7 Comparing synonymous and nonsynonymous changes
within and between species thus becomes a means of evaluating the relative
effects of drift and selection on the sequence in question (Kreitman 1996,
2000).
4. The Nearly Neutral Theory. In 1972, Tomoko Ohta began to argue for
a more significant role for weakly selected mutants. Ohta’s proposal re-
fined the neutral theory by arguing that the large numbers of rare alleles
being detected by electrophoretic surveys of natural populations could be
explained by positing larger numbers of slightly deleterious mutants (Ohta
1973; Ohta and Gillespie 1996). Ohta’s theory was called the nearly neutral
theory because it emphasized mutants at the border of neutrality and selec-
tion.
According to Ohta and Gillespie (1996), in the earliest versions of the
nearly neutral theory Ohta redefined “nearly neutral” mutants to be those
mutants whose selection coefficients are close to the reciprocal of the
population size, unlike Kimura’s definition of “nearly neutral” (effectively
neutral) mutants, where the selection coefficient is much less than the
reciprocal of the population size. In making this change, she modified
what we have called the “expected outcome” definition of “nearly neu-
tral.” We might also construe various “functional definitions” equivalent
to this modified concept of “nearly neutral”; Ohta notes that “the effect
of an amino acid substitution in a protein often produces only a minor
modification of a reaction coefficient” and that “molecular variants that
disturb very slightly the secondary structure of molecules, e.g. by opening
the stem region of a clover structure of tRNA, may represent a mutant
class with mild deleterious effects” (Ohta 1992, 272).
To put the point roughly, Ohta’s definition of “nearly neutral” includes
7. It is now recognized that synonymous mutants are not necessarily free from selection.
Organisms with strong codon bias may be subject to selection based on tRNA avail-
ability. Selection for different tRNAs thus renders synonymous mutants selected at a
lower level.
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Figure 1. Distinguishing the neutral and nearly neutral theories. Ohta’s “schematic
diagram” representing the “proportions of various classes of mutants” (from Ohta
1992, 271).
mutants that are less neutral than Kimura’s “nearly neutral” mutants.8
Thus, in effect, Ohta introduced a new way of classifying mutants by
expanding the category of mutants at the borderline between deleterious
and neutral (see Figure 1). The point is to consider specifically which
outcomes we should expect if a large proportion of mutations are nearly
neutral, rather than strictly or “effectively” neutral.9
As we will argue below, formalizing and redefining nearly neutral mu-
tants gave a stronger role to evolution where processes of drift and se-
lection both played significant roles. While the early nearly neutral theory
agreed with the strictly neutral or “simple neutral theory” that selected
mutants could be advantageous or deleterious, she emphasized that most
selected mutants, including nearly neutral mutants, were in fact deleterious
to some degree. The chief difference was the expansion of the proportion
of nearly neutral mutants.
Ohta later refined the nearly neutral theory to include both slightly del-
eterious and slightly advantageous mutants. She represented this in a dia-
gram from 2002 that shows the successive expansion of what were previously
understood to the borders between types of mutants (see Figure 2). So the
border between advantageous and harmful selected mutants becomes ex-
panded to include neutral mutants, and the new borders with neutrality
each get expanded to create a class of nearly neutral mutants that includes
8. This way of putting the point (in terms of mutants being more or less neutral)
suggests a view that Ohta in fact holds, namely, that mutants lie on a continuum: “a
continuum at one end of which are very nearly neutral mutations with undectable
phenotypic consequences, and at the other end of which are the mutations with a
distinct phenotypic effect, and on which Darwinian selective pressures can therefore
act” (Ohta 1974, 351).
9. Kimura did not foresee that an explicit consideration of nearly neutral mutations
would allow for outcomes such as a large number of rare alleles. According to Provine
(personal communication), Kimura accepted Ohta’s nearly neutral theory over the
strictly neutral theory until DNA data started to become available and he felt he could
return to advocating strictly neutrality at the DNA level. So, the 1983 book and articles
in the later 1980s reflect a return to a strictly neutral theory.
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Figure 2. Ohta’s refinement of her schematic diagram for different classes of mutations
(from Ohta 2002, 16136).
slightly deleterious and slightly advantageous mutants. Ohta lumps ad-
vantageous and deleterious mutants together as selected. This allows her
to emphasize that the nearly neutral class is intermediate between the
selected and neutral classes.
There is yet another ambiguity here, having to do with whether drift
alone is acting on the mutations or drift in combination with selection.
The case of strictly neutral mutations is clear-cut; they are subject to drift
alone. One could also, if one defines drift by the type of outcome it
produces, interpret nearly neutral mutants as being subject to drift alone,
since they seem to behave as strictly neutral mutants would. This is what
Kimura seems to have done in the 1960s (Kimura 1968a, 1968b) and even
in his later writings, where he states that the presence of “nearly neutral
but very slightly deleterious” mutations “allows extensive random drift”
(Kimura 1983, 143), without any mention of selection.10 On the other
hand, if one defines selection and drift in terms of causal processes, as
we argued for above, then nearly neutral mutations are subject to very
weak selection (discriminate sampling) and to drift in the form of indis-
criminate gamete sampling. On the process-oriented view, the effects of
drift “swamp” the effects of weak selection for nearly neutral mutations,
but both processes are occurring.11 We think that this provides a much
clearer conceptual picture of the biological phenomena at work.
10. Similarly, Hartl and Dykhuizen (1981) contrast (1) circumstances under which
alleles are neutral or nearly neutral and thus subject to drift with (2) circumstances
under which the same alleles are nonneutral and thus subject to selection.
11. This discussion shows that Pfeifer’s criticism of Millstein’s process-oriented defi-
nition of drift misses its mark (Pfeifer 2005). Pfeifer states that “Millstein’s definition
becomes too narrow to be of any help” because “in cases of near neutrality, selection
is operative, and, therefore, according to Millstein’s definition drift is not occurring”
(2005, 1137). On the contrary, it is only with a process-oriented definition that we can
appreciate the role that both selection and drift can play. Pfeifer appears to have
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Figure 3. A revised representation of the nearly neutral theory in relation to selection
theory and the neutral theory.
In Figure 3, we have tried to clarify Ohta’s schematic diagrams by
differentiating between deleterious and advantageous mutations. How-
ever, instead of contrasting selected and neutral or nearly neutral mutants,
we contrast deleterious, weakly deleterious, neutral, weakly advantageous,
and advantageous mutants.12 Ohta’s nearly neutral mutants are those that
are weakly deleterious or weakly advantageous, where “weakness” is de-
fined in terms of having a selection coefficient less than the reciprocal of
the population size. It is important to note that the relative proportions
of these different classes of mutants can shift over time, although most
biologists would agree that the proportion of advantageous mutants is
usually very small and the proportion of deleterious mutations is large.
Superimposed on the proportions of mutations are the actions of drift
and selection. Following Ohta, neutral mutants are assumed to be strictly
neutral and so subject only to drift. A small fraction of mutants at either
end of the diagram are also assumed to be so strongly selected that they
can be considered to be subject to selection only—these might be lethal
mutations, for instance. Most mutations, however, are subject to both
selection and drift. In the cases of weak selection, the effects of drift are
more prominent, and the resulting outcome is that expected from the
nearly neutral theory.
Ohta believed that the mixed processes of drift and selection affecting
overlooked the fact that on Millstein’s account, discriminate and indiscriminate pro-
cesses can be occurring simultaneously in the same population. Brandon 2005 makes
a similar error; see Millstein 2005 for a response to Brandon’s critique of the process-
oriented definition of drift.
12. That is, instead of a continuum from neutral to selected (see note 8), we propose
a continuum from strongly deleterious to neutral to strongly advantageous, with classes
varying in the strength of the drift and/or selection processes acting on the mutants
of the class.
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nearly neutral mutants could be distinguished from drift outcomes as-
sociated with strict neutrality. The challenge was to find a way to distin-
guish them empirically from outcomes associated with stronger selection
processes. When Ohta introduced her nearly neutral theory, Kimura’s
neutral theory was challenged by data on genetic variability measured in
population of Drosophila by Francisco Ayala and his coworkers. Ayala’s
data revealed a large number of relatively rare alleles. This did not con-
form to the distribution predicted by the neutral theory. Ohta realized
that the presence of slightly deleterious alleles could explain this distri-
bution. Ayala’s distribution thus became an outcome associated with near
neutrality. Ohta later argued that some features of the molecular clock,
including its overdispersion, could be best explained by the nearly neutral
theory (Ohta 2002). Much of the debate over these nearly neutral expla-
nations has been about whether the nearly neutral theory presents the
only route to these outcomes.13 Martin Kreitman, for instance, points out
that while weak selection provides the best explanation of high levels of
codon bias, the nearly neutral model is much more difficult to reject on
empirical grounds than the neutral model. Selection tests based on ratios
of replacement to synonymous changes can easily reject strictly neutral
models, thereby making them a good null hypotheses. However, Kreitman
argues that the nearly neutral theory is much more difficult to falsify,
because it can be rendered consistent with almost any pattern of variation
by invoking different histories of changes of population size (Kreitman
1996, 683). So, while there are some outcomes uniquely associated with
the nearly neutral theory, they are not as plentiful or as clearly agreed
upon as for the neutral theory.
5. Conclusion. Focusing on the nearly neutral theory forces us to reject
any simple dichotomy between drift and selection, at least in molecular
evolution. The strictly neutral case can limit itself to drift alone, and cases
of very strong selection (against lethal mutations, for instance) can ignore
drift. In the vast number of cases between these two extremes, both pro-
cesses of drift and selection are operating. The nearly neutral theory picks
out a group of these cases where drift has significant and detectable ef-
fect—specifically, the cases where the effects of drift outweigh the effects
of selection. That is, it tries to pick out a set of distinct outcomes that
map back to the causal processes of both drift and selection.
Dover was right that being nearly neutral is like being a little pregnant,
because the nearly neutral theory refers to a mix of drift and selection
processes, like a great many selectionist explanations. The nearly neutral
13. See Fay, Wyckoff, and Wu 2002 for an example of the impact of taking slightly
deleterious mutants into effect in selection tests.
558 MICHAEL R. DIETRICH AND ROBERTA L. MILLSTEIN
theory is indeed a little bit selective. But just as the first trimester of
pregnancy is different from the third, the nearly neutral theory has dif-
ferent outcomes produced by the different strengths of the causal processes
involved.
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